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Introduction 
Change is occurring around us at a tremendous rate. Each of these changes 
tends to increase the level of uncertainty facing decision makers all over the 
world whether these decision makers are the heads of corporations or individuals 
operating farm businesses. Recently, some major events which affect the prairie 
agricultural sector and the lives of each of us have occurred. Some of these 
major events are listed below. 
- the Gulf War in Iraq 
economic and civil unrest in the USSR 
- collapse of the GATT and its recent revival 
- a possible three way free trade agreement with the U.S. and Mexico 
- large debts in governments, corporations and farms 
- unification of Germany 
- Meech Lake collapse 
international trade war in agricultural commodities 
- finally, the most important of these in terms of direct financial impact 
for a Saskatchewan grain farm and the uncertainty for the upcoming crop 
year is GRIP. 1 
All of the above events affect the uncertainty facing decision makers at 
the farm level. However, prior to the announcement of GRIP, none have had a more 
direct impact on Saskatchewan farmers during the past few years than has the 
international trade war in agricultural commodities. Unprecedented use of export 
subsidies by both the U.S. and the E. E. C. have reduced the world price of 
agriculture commodities to levels below the cash costs of production based on 
many recent sales. As a result, the percentage of income grain producers in 
Saskatchewan earn from the market has fallen significantly over the last number 
of years. In order to stabilize farm incomes, both the federal and provincial 
governments have provided income support through various farm programs. At 
first, this support was provided through long-term income stabilization programs 
like Crop Insurance and the Western Grain Stabilization program (WGSP). However, 
when the WGSP began to "play out" due to its short five year average trigger 
mechanism, the federal government responded with ad hoc programs like the Special 
Canadian Grains I, Special Canadian Grains II and the Drought Assistance program 
of 1988. 
Many criticized the ad hoc nature of these programs because most were 
announced "after the fact" and thus did not provide producers any ability to plan 
for the crop year. In a sense, the ad hoc nature of these programs tended to 
increase the uncertainty faced by the agricultural producer because the producer 
had to "guess" whether there would be an ad hoc payment and perhaps just as 
importantly, he/she had to "guess" how and on what crops it would be paid. The 
1GRIP is the recently announced Gross Revenue Insurance Plan. It is assumed 
that the reader has a working knowledge of GRIP due to the numerous regional 
meetings that have been held in Saskatchewan to explain the program to farmers. 
Mr. Mike Makowsky presented the material in Saskatoon immediately prior to the 
presentation of this paper. 
"how it wou1d be paid" was very important since this could affect the eligibility 
of the farm operation and the size of its government payment. For instance, 
peas, lentils, mustard and other speciality crops had not been eligible under the 
Special Canadian Grains I program. 
Many people in the agricultural industry noted that the Canadian system of 
ad hocery contrasted sharply with the environment faced by U.S. farmers who 
operated under the U.S. Farm Bill. The Farm Bill, which is renegotiated every 
five years, provided clear support and signals to U.S. producers prior to their 
planting decisions. Target prices, loan rates, set asides, and conservation 
reserves, etc. were all transparent to the producer. Therefore, in the U.S., the 
producer faced no uncertainty with regards to government transfers. The rules 
of the game were known before they began to play. Not surprisingly, many argued 
that Canadian farm policy designers could learn a lot from the American system. 
In response to the need for a more long-term approach to farm policy in 
Canada, the federal government began the Agriculture Canada Agriculture Policy 
Review with the Agriculture Outlook Conference held in December of 1989. They 
1 aunched this review process by presenting a green paper on the agriculture 
industry entitled Growing Together. The review process set up a number of task 
forces to look at different components of the industry. The objective of one of 
the task forces was to examine and design long-term safety nets for the Canadian 
agricultural sector. 
After approximately a year of deliberations and a couple of interim 
reports, the safety net committee announced two new long-term agricultural safety 
net programs; Gross Revenue Insurance Plan (GRIP) and Net Income Stabilization 
Account (NISA). The remainder of the paper focuses on the GRIP program and its 
possible influences in Saskatchewan for the coming crop year. 
Coming to Grips with GRIP 
GRIP represents a major change in pra1r1e agriculture policy. First, it 
has added a degree of certainty because now producers know that there will be 
more support dollars from provincial and federal governments. However, due to 
the lateness of the program announcement and the lack of any new legislation, the 
program also adds some additional uncertainty for the upcoming crop year. Many 
producers and agricultural professionals are still uncertain regarding exactly 
how the new program wi 11 work. Many of the "rules of the game" are st i 11 unknown 
at this time. In particular, little or no information is available on premium 
levels for crops, the final support price (IMAP) for each commodity, how new 
crops may be treated, and a whole host of other important features which are 
important to decision makers in determining what to plant this spring? This 
uncertainty is illustrated by the many farmers who are asking, "What should I 
do?" and "What wi 11 my neighbours do?" 
The second major change associated with GRIP is in regards to how the 
program will make payouts. GRIP pro vi des an annua 1 set of p 1 ann i ng prices by 
crop. Therefore, it is not merely a safety net .... but a set of planning prices 
for the coming crop year. In other words, GRIP prices and yields will be more 
important than market prices and expected yields for many crops this year. 
Consequently, for 1991, GRIP effectively muzzles market signals. However, for 
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a more detailed discussion of how GRIP muzzles market signals as well as an 
explanation of other important concerns we have with the GRIP program, we provide 
a paper written with several colleagues as an appendix to this paper. 2 The 
appendix also discusses two possible amendments to GRIP which would alleviate 
many of the concerns we address in the paper. The remainder of the current paper 
addresses the farm management implications of GRIP based on many of the concerns 
discussed in the appendix. 
Farm Management Implications of GRIP 
Farm management strategies as a result of GRIP are often innovative and 
unique since the strategy for any particular farm operation depends on many 
factors. The purpose of this section is to discuss these factors and their 
implications for decision making. The first important factor is the recent 
hi story of crops grown on the farm operation. This is important because the 
crops you have grown in the past and the percentage of the cultivated acreage 
seeded on a farm operation are important factors in determining how many acres 
are eligible for GRIP this year. For instance the 10% increase in seeded acreage 
rule means that your past seeded acreage wi 11 influence how many acres are 
eligible for GRIP this year. In addition, whether a producer has grown specialty 
crops in the last 3 years is also important because non-specialty crop growers 
will have restrictions which specialty crop growers will not. (Current 
discussions suggest a maximum of 20 percent of seeded acreage for special crops 
will be imposed). 
The second important factor is the individual producer's historical yield 
with crop insurance for each of the crops grown. An individual's historical 
yield with crop insurance is generally a function of their claim history with 
crop insurance. Producers with low claim histories with crop insurance tend to 
have yield coverage greater than the area average while the opposite occurs for 
producers with high claim histories. Producers who have not participated in crop 
insurance have to enter GRIP at the area average coverage for their quality of 
soil unless they can provide historical production records for each of the crops 
they have grown on their farm for a 10 year period. 3 Therefore, with GRIP, the 
producer's history with crop insurance may be more important than the current 
level of management in determining gross and net farm income for 1991. High 
level management producers who used high levels of input but who have not 
participated in crop insurance are at a potential disadvantage for 1991. 
The most profitable strategy with GRIP in 1991 appears to be to seed the 
crops with the highest GRIP revenue guarantee net of the producer's "expected" 
cash costs of production where the premium cost by crop for GRIP is considered 
as one of the important "expected" costs of production. However, given the 
2See the paper "Proposed Amendments to GRIP", Richard Gray, Ward Weisensel, 
Ken Rosaasen, Hartley Furtan and Daryl Kraft, which is appended. 
3The Crop Insurance Corporation may accept less than 10 years of individual 
records under special circumstances. 
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rather simp1e strategy indicated above, there are a number of additional factors 
to keep in mind when deciding which crops to grow in 1991. (I) Higher input use 
does not equal higher profit in the short-run. The reason for this is that it 
is virtually impossible to do better than the revenue guarantees for many of the 
crops in 1991. Therefore, there is no immediate reward for intensive input use. 
However, it may provide greater future rewards due to increased future yield 
coverage. (2) Yield outcomes for 1991 will affect future levels of coverage 
through changes in a producer's individual yield. Therefore, low yields this 
year mean less coverage next year. (3) The bankability of GRIP differs for board 
and non-board crops. 
The concept of bankability is important and we will elaborate on it further 
here. Within the GRIP program, the safety net committee recognized that perfect 
revenue insurance was unworkable for two reasons. (1) Perfect revenue insurance 
meant that the administrators of the program would have to have a record of every 
sale as these sales occurred throughout the year on every farm operation in the 
province. They realized that this was administratively unfeasible. (2) Perfect 
revenue insurance would take away all the incentive to market commodities 
effectively and seek to achieve the highest price by aggressively seeking market 
opportunities. In other words, with perfect revenue insurance a producer would 
be indifferent to the price they actually sold their product at (unless of course 
the producer could sell for a price better than the guaranteed price under GRIP, 
which is very unlikely for most crops during the 1991/1992 crop year) because 
they know that they would be insured for the full difference between the market 
price and the guaranteed price. Therefore, the safety net committee decided that 
all producers would be paid indemnities based on the difference between the 
guaranteed price and the average market price of the commodity over some 
specified period of time after harvest. As a result, producers who sell their 
commodities for better than the average market price will receive more than the 
guaranteed revenue and producers who sell their commodities for lower than the 
average market price will receive less than the guaranteed revenue for their farm 
based on average market prices. Therefore, the GRIP program is much more 
bankable for board crops than it is for non-board crops because with board crops 
all producers receive the average pooled price. In contrast, with non-board 
crops, producers are not "guaranteed" their guaranteed revenue unless they can 
sell for the average market price or better. 
A further implication for both Board and Non-Boa,_rd crops is that if 
inventory remains unsold at the end of the crop year, it is valued at the end of 
the crop year. This inventory is an asset but it is not cash. Therefore, if 
stockpiles of unsold inventories exist, these are also not bankable. In 
addition, on this unsold inventory individual producers face the price risk of 
moving this inventory into the new crop year. 
Implications for Farm Business Organizations 
GRIP will create incentives to alter the organizational structure of many 
farm operations because of a number of factors. First, with GRIP, a producer 
must give 3 years notice of withdrawal and must wait an additional 2 years to get 
back in. In addition, it is well known that the payouts in GRIP are expected to 
be significantly greater than premiums in the first couple of years. Future 
payouts, however, are likely to fall rapidly to the point where premium costs to 
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producers may exceed the expected payouts. There are two characteristics about 
the program which are responsible for this and these are understood by 
knowledgeable producers. First, most producers know that the indexed moving 
average price is expected to fall and, second, many farmers are expecting market 
prices for most commodities to increase in the future. Both of these factors are 
consistent with reduced GRIP payouts in the long-run. Therefore, many producers 
will attempt to seek arrangements where they can 1 imit or control their 
participation in GRIP. They want to be participating when the program is paying 
out on net, but do not want to be paying expensive premi urns when expected payouts 
are small relative to premiums. 
Most of the changes in organizational structure will be in the form of 
innovative leasing arrangements. However, these arrangements, like the GRIP 
program itself, will be different for every case due to a number of factors: 
(I) Every operator has a different hi story with the crop insurance 
corporation. (2) Each producer has individual yields by crop. 
(3) The most productive producers may not be in the best position to 
make offers for land leases because they may have never participated 
in crop insurance and may not be able to establish individual yields 
with farm records. 
In addition, many new aggressive producers don't have enough years of experience 
to establish accurate individual yields with crop insurance. They will be at a 
distinct disadvantage to producers who have long histories with crop insurance 
and have been able to build up their coverage adjustments (individual yields) for 
various crops. Consequently, another criticism of the current GRIP program is 
that its coverage will be based on "not how good you are ... but how good you 
used to be." There can be no doubt that this inability to get individual yield 
coverage which reflects the expected yields of a new intensive operation will 
create barriers to entry for new entrants. As an example, how can a new young 
farmer bid against an older farmer for a land lease when the new producer gets 
GRIP at the area average yield and the older farmer gets GRIP at I25% of the area 
average yield. What is really ironic is that the new young farmer may have been 
able to out bid the older farmer based on market returns. 
Within farm families there are also a number of factors to consider in the 
land lease arrangement. With multiple operators whose history do you use? Given 
the importance of the IO% total acreage rule and the 20% specialty crop rule, we 
list some of the important questions to ask when deciding who should take GRIP 
and on what acres. (I) What crops did each of the operators seed over the last 
3 years? (2) What percentage of total cultivated acreage did each of the 
operators seed over the last 3 years? (3) What are the yield histories of each 
of the operators? (4) How does one qualify as a farmer within the program? The 
responses to each of these questions are important in the organizational 
decisions of the farm operation. 
Crop Share versus Cash Leases 
Traditionally, crop share leases have earned a premium over cash leases 
because in a crop share 1 ease the landlord accepts part of the risk. This 
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d1fference between the value of the crop share and cash lease is usually called 
a risk premium (i.e., a payment for taking on risk). However, for new crop share 
leases in 1991 with GRIP,, the production of crops marketed by the Canadian Wheat 
Board (CWB) should have no risk premium because the only risk associated with 
income for Board crops will be the possibility of carryover. 4 Non-CWB crops 
should have a smaller but not zero risk premium because the market risk still 
exists for these crops. GRIP effectively eliminates any production risk for 
1991. It is interesting but not surprising that the difference in risk premiums 
for crop share leases for Board and non-Board crops coincides with the 
bankability arguments outlined in an earlier section. 
Leasing and Breaking Hayland 
From an environmental perspective, the current GRIP program has 
restrictions on the breaking of land seeded to hay, forage or pasture. These 
restrictions are embedded in the 10% rule which does not allow a producer to 
increase seeded acreage more than 10% of the three year average of the ratio of 
seeded acreage to cultivated acreage. However, the GRIP program does allow a 
producer to farm newly added 1 and in the same way as the remainder of the 
operation. Therefore, a producer could lease pasture and break it with nobody 
the wiser in this program. Particularly if crop insurance has no previous record 
of the land through its hay or forage insurance program. 
Summary and Conclusions 
There is no doubt that the Western Canadian farm sector needs the dollars 
expected in the current GRIP program. Our major concerns are with how these 
dollars will be paid because how the dollars are paid determines how producers 
will respond to any program. The payout mechanism in the current GRIP program 
distorts crop choice and creates the incentive for moral hazard in input use. 
In addition, the current GRIP program encourages innovative farm management 
arrangements which could be avoided with better program design. We present some 
modifications to the current GRIP, called WGRIP and AGRIP, which we believe 
address many of the major problems with GRIP. We agree that a safety net is 
needed ... but not a set of planning prices. 
4We are assuming that government payments are shared in the crop share 
lease. 
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A. Introduction 
The proposed GRIP and NISA programs represent the •st significant Canadian 
Agricultural Legislation in the last fifty years. The anticipated dollar size 
of 1 evi es and payouts make it the 1 argest agricultural program ever. The 
. structure of GRIP which provides a revenue guarantee for each commodity based on 
the previous fifteen year indexed moving average of prices (IMAP) represents a 
major departure from the traditional view that agriculture should be market 
responsive. In the first few years of the progra., these IMAP prices will be so 
high relative to the market prices that they will effectively muzzle any market 
signals. Major decisions on what crop to grow will be based on !MAP prices 
rather than market prices. 
In fairness to the program designers, we point out that GRIP presents a 
number of significant improvements over similar inca.e support programs 
implemented in the past. The GRIP has made the following iiiprovements over WGSA: 
- payouts are made on farm fed grains 
- there is not a requirement to sell grain within a particular crop year 
to be eligible for a payout 
- the range of eligible crops has been expanded 
- the payouts are more predictable 
- a 15 year moving ayerage of prices provides •re support during long 
periods of low prices when compared to a five year average of prices. 
Therefore, while we do have some s.ignificant concerns with GRIP, we feel an 
amended program must maintain these positive features. 
B. Significant Concerns 
GRIP has been designed to provide income support for agricultural producers 
across Canada in response to unprecedented low inca.es in the agricultural 
sector. While there is no doubt that this support is needed, we believe that 
GRIP in its current fona has three serious probleiiS which must be addressed 
immediately to avoid possible damages to the agricultural sector. The three 
major concerns are: 
(1) GRIP will muzzle market signals with the IMAP price and will be the 
major factor in the 1991/92 cropping choice of producers; 
(2) Expanded acreage of specialty crops may glut s.all markets, depress 
prices and greatly increase program costs; and 
49 
{3) GRIP creates an incentive for a producer to use very few inputs on any 
crop which he/she does not intend to insure for many years into the 
future. 
The first of these concerns deals with how the current GRIP proposal may 
affect crop choice on individual farm operations. While the current version of 
GRIP has an acreage cap of 10~ to control the incentive to increase overall 
seeded acreage, it does not put any control on the crops an individual producer 
may seed within this seeded acreage base. Therefore, in its current form, GRIP 
has the potential to encourage excessive production of some crops which can glut 
markets an~ depress prices for these crops in the prairie region. The GRIP 
provides the incentive to seed crops on a particular farm which earn the highest 
target revenue per acre net of cash costs of production. 
The current payout mechanism is not at all responsive to current market 
prices. Some people may argue that a 15 year ~verage of prices may reflect 
annual relative prices in any year quite accurately. However, there is strong 
evidence to the contrary. For example, the Manitoba !MAP price for canola and 
flax are $284 and $283 per tonne, respectively. This reflects that on average 
the flax price has been nearly equal to canola prices. However, during the past 
15 years the relative price of flax to canola has ranged from 1.4 to 0.7. The 
relative price differences reflect market circumstances for the time period such 
as inventories of the crop, expected production, utilization and other market 
forces. The probability that the indexed average prices of the last 15 years 
will be a reflection of the relative values in the 1991/92 crop year is extremely 
low. 
This problem becomes even more important for crops where Canadian acreage 
and production can influence price (i.e. lentils, peas, ·mustard, canary seed, 
etc.). In the crops listed, an increase in acreage may drive the price of the 
crop to an extremely low level, but this low level will not discourage the 
production of the crop in the following crop year because revenue will again be 
guaranteed. This leads immediately to the second concern regarding the program 
cost. 
Due to the potential incentives GRIP may create to seed alternative crops, 
particularly specialty crops where price and production are NOT independent, it 
is extremely difficult for those who administer GRIP to control or estimate the 
potential costs of the overall program. Important variables in program cost 
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calculations are beyond the control of those administrating the program. They 
are in the hands of each individual farm operator. For instance, suppose that 
the program provides an incentive to grow lentils and, as a result, lentil 
acreage increases significantly. Higher acreage and higher production will lower 
lentil prices and force the government to pay larger indemnities on larger acres 
thus increasing overall program costs. 
A hidden cost to the Canadian economy is the incentive not to grow specific 
crops because of a lower revenue guarantee under GRIP. A relatively low 
guarantee may reflect circumstances in the last 15 years rather than today's 
situation. This is particularly true for co111110dities which have undergone receflt 
market development. In these commodities, farm organizations, grain companies 
and the Canadian Wheat Board have worked hard to expand domestic and export 
sales. However, with GRIP, supplies of these historically less attractive crops 
may be reduced in 1991. Some orders will not be filled and some customers will 
turn to alternative suppliers. Assuming that GRIP will again be a factor that 
distorts market signals in 1992, buyers may dismiss Canada as a reliable supplier 
in these markets. A preliminary examination of GRIP IMAP prices would indicate 
this could be a factor in both the barley and mustard markets in 1991. 
Unfortunat~ly though, these are not the only reasons why the program may cost 
more than current cost estimates suggest. 
Mora 1 hazard occurs when a program or po 11 cy takes away the incentive 
associated with doing your best given your current set of resources. Therefore, 
moral hazard is a problem when program design adversely affects the incentives 
of individual decision makers. Producers reacting to these new incentives are 
likely operating optimally and legally. In GRIP., target revenues are higher than 
expected market revenues for all crops. Therefore, the producer has little 
incentive to try to grow a good crop because he/she is not rewarded, in terms of 
increased gross farm income, for doing so. This means that the producer can 
increase short run net income by cutting back on input costs and receiving the 
gross revenue guarantee. If a producer intends to have GRIP on a particular crop 
in the future, there will be some incentive to maintain the average yield with 
the GRIP program. However, a producer may not intend to insure the crop in the 
future and therefore will practice moral hazard if: 
(1) he is growing a non-traditional crop on his farm; 
(2) he has given notice to leave GRIP in three years; 
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(3) the producer is renting the land and intends to give up the lease; 
(4) the producer is about to sell the land; or 
(5) the producer is in the financial position that he must maximize short 
run returns. 
Moral hazard will also increase program costs because average yields will tend 
to be lower than those used to calculate the initial cost estimates. 
C. Incentives for Marketing Effectively 
From a revenue insurance point of view it would be advantageous to provide 
payouts based on the actual prices individuals received for each crop. However, 
the safety net committee recognized that this could not be made operational 
because it would require information on each sale each individual producer made. 
Therefore, the committee moved away from perfect revenue insurance to a payout 
based on a season average market price for each crop. This was an important 
change. If the payout had been based on individual returns and sales, the 
incentive for each producer to manage the sale of his product to seek the highest 
return in the marketplace would be eliminated. For example, if coverage was 
based on the prices the individual actually received, a producer selling his 
canola for $4.00/bu. would receive exactly the same gross revenue after GRIP as 
someone who sold his crop for $6.00/bu. This would eliminate the incentive for 
good marketing which would increase program costs for any given level of 
protection. 
D. Objectives 
In seeking modification of GRIP one has to be very careful not to lose 
sight of the original objectives of the policy. The Federal Provincial committee 
on Agriculture in a report entitled Growing Together defined four Policy Pillars 
and Principles for future agricultural Policy: 
- improved market responsiveness 
- greater self reliance in the agrifood sector 
- a national policy which recognizes regional diversity 
- increased environmental sustainability 
In The Report to Ministers of Agriculture from Grains and Oilseed Safety Net 
Committee the committee addressed the extent to which GRIP and NISA were 
consistent with these· objectives. The committee felt that the proposed GRIP and 
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NISA were consistent w;th these objectives. To quote from the conclusions of the 
Report: 
•The committee reaffirms its belief that the cOibined GRIP and NISA 
proposal meets the Policy Pillars and Principles for Action 
enunciated in Growing Together. In particular, the new program 
proposal will provide income stabilization for grain producers in a 
manner which encourages market responsiveness and which recognizes 
regional diversity, and which contributes to self reliance and long 
term sustainability.• 
Clearly GRIP provides an income safety net far .ore comprehensive than 
exists in current programs. The long term, 15 year indexed moving average price 
provides greater stabilization than was afforded by the 5 year moving average net 
cash flow in WGSA. Targeting Gross Revenue, rather than either price or yield, 
makes a great deal of sense. Unfortunately, while the concept of moving from an 
area average to individual coverage is appealing, it cannot be made operational 
without creating considerable misallocation of resources in the sector. As we 
have carefully outlined above, in our assessment, GRIP fails to meet the Policy 
Pillars and Principles for Action. As outlined in Section B, (1) GRIP is not 
market responsive. Cha~ges in the relative prices of crops will have little or 
no impact on the choice of crops grown by producers so that producers may add 
production to already glutted markets. (2) Grip does not encourage self-reliance 
as the payout from the program is more important than the level of grain output 
achieved. (3) GRIP does not recognize regional diversity. GRIP off-loads much 
of the cost of the support for the agricultural sector to the tax payer in the 
regions which produce grain. Given the size of the agricultural sector in these 
regions, the additional tax burden comes when these regional economies can least 
afford it. (4) Finally, GRIP is not environmentally sound. As outlined in 
Section B, the large expected payout provides an incentive to bring often fragile 
marginal land into production to collect program benefits and to adopt farming 
practices that are neither economically nor· environmentally sound. The exclusion 
of hayland and alfalfa may result in the rebreaking of this land to collect 
program payments. 
In this proposal for an Amended GRIP, we recognize that design of .any 
effective farm safety net that is fully consistent with all of these objectives 
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may in fact be impossible. We argue and will subsequently show that minor 
modifications to GRIP can (1) make the program much more market responsive, and 
(2) improve resource allocation by eliminating much of the potential for· moral 
hazard present in the program. This will vastly improve the efficiency of the 
program to deliver the much needed income support for the sector. 
E. Proposed Amendments 
Rather than proposing a single comprehensive package of amendments we 
propose two possible levels of amendments. In Proposal A we suggest only a minor 
modification to GRIP that addresses the market responsiveness. In Proposal B we 
suggest a somewhat larger change to GRIP that clearly separates Area Revenue 
Insurance from the existing Crop Insurance. When used in tandem, the second 
approach provides very similar protection to GRIP without many of the incentives 
to misallocate resources. In the final section we suggest other changes that 
would address a much larger range of shortcomings of GRIP. 
Proposal A 
Wheat Based GRIP (WBGRIP) 
A farmer receives GRIP for all the spring wheat he plants. However, if he 
chooses to grow an alternative crop he receives a payment based on the following 
formula: 
Payout • SA x RAP x Y/ RAY 
SA • Seeded Acres of alternative crops seeded by farmer 
RAP • Risk Area average Payout per acre for wheat 
Y • Risk Area 15 year average Yield for wheat for the individuals soil 
classes*( ie. J farmer may have class 0 and F soils) 
RAY • Risk Area 15 year average Yield for wheat 
* Soil classes range from A to P in Saskatchewan and are used by Crop Insurance 
to adjust guaranteed yield on the basis of soil quality. 
A separate calculation would be made for fallow and stubble crops. Here the 
payout would be based on the payout for fallow and stubble spring wheat, 
respectively. The producer would have the option also to purchase regular Crop 
Insurance for alternative (non-spring wheat) crops. 
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Example Al: 
A producer decides to grow 100 acres of lentils or any crop other than wheat. 
His payout, (regardless of lentil prices and yields) would be calculated using 
the following formula: 
SA • 100, RAP • $40, Y• 30 (class D), RAY • 20, 
Payout • 100 x 40 x 30/20, 
Payout • 100 x $60 • $6000 
The farmer can expect the same payout per acre regardless of the crop grown 
other than wheat. Therefore, he has the incentive to choose the crop with·the 
highest expected market return. This mechanism would not distort crop choice. 
If a producer expected market returns per acre in an alternative crop higher than 
what he would receive in the market growing wheat, he would grow the alternative 
crop. If the market returns were expected to be lower than for wheat, he would 
grow wheat. 
The market responsiveness of this type of program has another very 
appealing feature. New crops can be grown and supported immediately without a 
lengthy waiting period for the establishment of price and yield history which is 
a requirement for GRIP. The extension of the program to any type of crop or land 
use only requires a change in t~e list of eligible crops, which we suggest the 
list should be left open ended. 
This mechanism also allows the producer the option of receiving a 
guaranteed return. An individual concerned about risk can fully protect the 
GRIP level of income by growing wheat. To reduce some of the yield risk from 
choosing to grow an alternate crop, these crops could be made eligible for crop 
insurance at the market price. 
This mechanism may also reduce the scope for moral hazard. Note that under 
the current GRIP program a producer who never has grown Canary seed may choose 
to grow the crop and not·put on any inputs. The individual may face no adverse 
consequences from a lower ten year average yield of Canary seed if there are no 
plans to seed it in the future. Under this proposed mechanism, Canary seed will 
be managed for the maximum net return per acre at the market price. The producer 
is less likely to jeopardize his long term spring wheat yield for the sake of 
program benefits since spring wheat is a very important crop on many farms. 
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Proposal B 
AGRIP - Area Gross Revenue I.nsurance Program 
This proposal involves two separate programs which would remain separate 
and voluntary. The first is a modified form of the current GRIP program {AGRIP). 
The second is crop insurance as it operated in the 1990 crop year. The producer 
could choose to enrol in one the other or both. First, we will describe the 
modified GRIP {AGRIP). 
The modified GRIP, AGRIP, would operate as an area program as opposed to 
an individual program. The size of these areas {i.e. RM's or townships) and 
calculations to smooth indemnity payments across different areas is arbitrary and 
could be decided at a later date. The areas may be as small as townships or as 
large as insurance risk areas. Under AGRIP, each producer would be guaranteed 
an area average yield for spring wheat based on his/her soil classification 
multiplied by 70% of the !MAP price. This is the guaranteed revenue. This area 
average spring wheat yield would be a weighted average of stubble and 
summerfallow yields based on the 3 year history of acreage of stubble and 
summerfallow wheat in the region. An alternative to basing the guaranteed 
revenue and payouts solely on spring wheat would be to use a regional market 
basket of crops to set the guaranteed revenue. However, in our example we focus 
on the simplest example where stubble and summerfallow spring wheat are the only 
crops in the market basket. Spring wheat was selected because it is a crop that 
is consistently grown across the prairie region and thus would make it easier to 
administrate the program in the initial year. In the long run {i.e., after the 
initial year), a market basket concept would be preferable and we discuss our 
reasons for this preference in more detail at the end of the section. 
Payouts would be made on a regional basis when the area average yield, as 
described above, multiplied by the market price of spring wheat is less than the 
guaranteed revenue for the region. Once the payout per acre for a particular 
year is determined, it would be paid to each producer in the region for all 
seeded acr~s regardless of whether those acres were in wheat or any other annual 
crop. Therefore, the program is st i 11 market responsive s i nee the producer st i 11 
has the incentive to seed alternative crops based on market signals. 
Furthermore, there is no incentive for moral hazard because the producer cannot 
influence their indemnity by incurring lower than average yields. The only 
variable a producer can choose to affect the size of his payout is total seeded 
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acres on fallow and stubble. Consequently, two factors which could have 
adversely affected the governmental costs of the progra. are alleviated under 
this approach. The major disadvantage of this approach is that it is no longer 
a program which is individual to each producer. Note however, the program does 
contain offsets at the area level .. If a township hid very high yields and low 
prices or low yields and high prices no payouts would be triggered. This is an 
important feature which should virtually eliminate payouts in an area in years 
when they are not required and thus control the cost of the program. 
We resolve the loss of individuality of the a-ended GRIP by arguing that 
Crop Insurance be maintained as it appeared in the 1990 crop year. Producers 
would have the option of taking crop insurance to protect them against individual 
crop failures of all crops including spring wheat. Moral hazard in crop 
insurance may exist but the incentive to practice .oral hazard is significantly 
less than with the current GRIP, particular if crop insurance does not offer 
insurance prices greater than market prices. Crop insurance would still be an 
attractive program to producers because it offers .any benefits which could not 
be implemented in the amended GRIP. These include; spot loss hail coverage, 
reseeding benefits, quality ·guarantees and many others. 
The major advantage of the above program is that it allows a producer to 
purchase Crop Insurance coverage if he wants it. However, the program 
substantially reduces the incentive to practice .ural hazard and· it is neutral 
to the crop choice decisions made by producers. This ·is important for two 
reasons. (1) Program costs from an administrative perspective are much easier 
to estimate and much easier to control since producer responses to the program 
will be minimal. Producers may tend to increase acreage up to the 10%. seeded cap 
in GRIP but will do so in a market responsive ~~aDDer. This will limit the 
potentia 1 costs of the program, part i cu 1 ar 1 y for crops where price and production 
are not independent. (2) Neutrality of crop choice ~thin the amended program 
is important because the last thing we want to do with an agricultural policy is 
destroy the fragile markets for many of the specialty crops produced in the 
prairie region. We have spent many years developing institutions and processing 
centres to help the flow of these products fr011 the farm gate to tt\e final 
consumer. In the process, we have diversified our ecD~~CaJ. The current GRIP has 
the potential to reverse all this hard work and put us .any years back in the 
market development process. 
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In conclusion, we return again to the regional market basket approach which 
we mentioned above. The advantage of a market basket approach in calculating 
guaranteed revenues and payments is that it would be more sensitive to the crop 
mix in each of the regions. The basket would be based on the acreage weighted 
average of IMAP prices multiplied by the acreage weighted average yields for both 
stubble and summerfallow for the major crops in the region. An example of this 
calculation for a single year in a particular region is illustrated belowr 
.:... •IMAP•ACRE• AA~•FACRE1+AAYS1•SACRE1 
k 0.70 I I . ACRE. 
GR. /w1 I 
N 
l:ACR~ 
,., 
where IMAP1 is the IMAP price for crop i, ACREi is the total acreage in the 
region seeded to crop i (both fallow and stubble acreage), AAYFi is the area 
average yield for crop i grown on summerfallow, FACRE1 is the total acreage of 
crop i planted on fallow in the regi~n, AAYS1 is the area average yield for crop 
i grown on stubble, SACREi is the total acreage planted on stubble of crop i in 
the region, and N is the total number of crops in the market basket. 
Using this market basket approach, if the guaranteed revenue is calculated 
as shown above, payouts would be based the actual area shortfall using the same 
basic equation by substituting actual yield and actual prices for average yields 
and IMAP prices. The only difference between this market basket approach and our 
spring wheat example is the size of the basket. A single crop basket of spring 
wheat simple means that N•l where the subscript 1 refers to spring wheat. 
Finally, both WBGRIP and AGRIP are much less likely to become targets of 
trading partners in GATT as they are more neutral to production and marketing 
choices than the original GRIP. The income support is generally available and 
not tied to specific commodity production and would therefore be viewed more 
favourable under existing GATT rules. 
F. Other Important Issues and Shortcomings 
' 0 The Amendments to GRIP wh1ch we have proposed increase the market 
responsiveness of producers and reduces the scope for moral hazard. These 
changes will enhance the efficiency of the program to deliver a desired level of 
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income support. However, these proposa 1 s do not address many of the other 
important shortcomings of GRIP. If the Safety Net Policy Pillars are expanded 
to include the distribution of income; then equity issues become more apparent. 
1) Equity Issues 
The proposals do not address equity issues. There are two very pressing 
equity issues which should be addressed: a) the transfer of some of the Federal 
responsibility for agriculture to the provincial tax payers and b) the support 
of individuals with incomes above the income of most Canadians with tax dollars. 
The introduction of GRIP represents a major shift in the funding of support 
programs for agriculture. In Saskatchewan, the change in the Federal 
Government's financial commitments in moving out of WGSA and Crop Insurance to 
GRIP is a meagre ~ ($278m/$258m - 1.0) The producers share of contributions 
increase by 35~ ($31lm/S229m - 1.0). The Government of Saskatchewan's Financi ~1 
commitments increase by over 355~ ( $197m/$43m - 1.0). GRIP will cost 
Saskatchewan taxpayers over $180 per year per capita. This increased tax burden 
comes at a time when the grain trade war has already depressed grain prices and 
the provincial economy. 
A equity issue that should be raised is the amount of program benefits an 
individual producer can receive. For the upcoming year, an individual seeding 
5000 acres could receive a payment as large as $250,000 from GRIP. Assuming the 
program is actuarially sound, the $16/acre premium subsidy for the same 
individual, $80,000, could be considered as the annual subsidy to this 
individual. If the objective of the program is to support agricultural income, 
then this type of large individual subsidy may reduce the long run support for 
the program by urban voters. To address this issue at least two options exist: 
a) place a limit on acres eligible for coverage by an individual or b) Gross up 
GRIP payments by a percentage for the purposes of income taxation. For example, 
a GRIP payment of 10,000 would have to be reported as $11,000 for income tax. 
In this scheme, producers with high incomes would receive reduced after tax 
benefits from the program which would in part address the equity issue. 
2) Environmental Issues and Long Run Resource Use 
A further concern which should be addressed in the program is the incentive 
to break up marginal land and enrol it in GRIP. Clearly, from an environmental 
point of view this should be stopped. For ease of implementation, the program 
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could contain a "sod buster" and "swamp buster provisions" similar to the ones 
used in US farm programs. Under these provisions any new land brought into 
production is not eligible for any US farm program benefits. A similar policy 
could be adopted for GRIP. A preferred alternative is to allow producers to 
enrol acres of perennial forage into the AGRIP program. The payment per acre 
would be determined in a similar way as proposed for all annual crops. 
The GRIP program has already been adjusted from the initial proposal 
presentation with the suggestion that a 10% increase in cropped acres be applied 
to each producers historical cropping intensity. These and other positive 
changes which improve its operation either environmentally, economically or in 
addressing equity issues will result in a better program for farmers, the 
agricultural industry and taxpayers. 
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